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Abstract 
The 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires in Victoria, Australia, killed 173 people 
and affected 430,000 hectares of land.  Before communities could begin to 
rebuild, tonnes of burnt and potentially hazardous debris had to be removed.  
Although largely unprepared for a disaster of this scale, there was a collective 
response to move with urgency towards a common goal: to remove public 
health hazards and to get communities into the rebuilding process as quickly 
as possible.  Five key decisions were made during the clean-up process: the 
establishment of the (Victorian Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction 
Authority); full government funding for building demolition; the single waste 
classification; the appointment of a single contract and the construction of a 
new landfill cell.  For each key decision the following are analysed:  the 
decision-making process: delays: organisational considerations: legal 
implications; and environmental, economic and social effects.  Overall the 
demolition and debris removal response was successful, however, authorities 
need to plan for their response in future events, which may require an entirely 
different response.  Planning is necessary to give decision-makers the tools 
and information necessary to make timely, effective and coordinated decisions 
after any given event.   
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1 Introduction 
The 7 February 2009 “Black Saturday” bushfires in Victoria, Australia, were 
the most devastating bushfires in Australian history.  173 people were killed in 
78 communities and over 430,000 hectares of land and 2000 properties were 
destroyed (VBRRA, 2009).   
 
Due to the intense heat of the fires (up to 1200°C) (Victorian Bushfires Royal 
Commission, 2009), many of the affected buildings were reduced to a pile of 
twisted metal, masonry rubble and ash.  The waste matrix included: mixed 
ash; concrete rubble and bricks; partially burnt dimensional timber and fence 
posts (treated); metal; vegetation and trees; corpses (removed by the 
Coroner); household hazardous wastes (including asbestos); and vehicles.  
The Commonwealth and State governments elected to pay for and facilitate 
demolition and removal of all building related debris in the affected areas. 
 
This research looks at the waste management process during the recovery 
phase of the bushfire response.  This case study will be used by the authors as 
part of a wider study on disaster waste management systems.  The aim of the 
wider study is to develop a strategic and integrated approach to planning for 
and responding to disaster waste.   
 
There is a full length case study report available at www.resorgs.org.nz. 
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2 Disaster Waste Management Background 
Depending on their type and severity, and the nature of the built environment, 
disasters can create large volumes of inert and hazardous debris.  Recent 
natural disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Booth, 2010, Johnson 
and Correa, 2010, Kahn, 2010), Hurricane Katrina 2005 (Luther, 2008, 
USEPA, 2008, Brown and Milke, 2009),and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
(Basnayake et al., 2005, Petersen, 2006) have all generated volumes of waste 
which overwhelmed existing solid waste capacities and required extraordinary 
management approaches. 
 
Disaster debris can impede rescuers and emergency services reaching 
survivors; inhibit provision of lifeline support; pose a public and 
environmental health hazard; and hinder the social and economic recovery of 
the affected area.  Poor management of a clean-up effort can result in a slow 
and costly recovery which is potentially risky to public and environmental 
health in both the short and long term.   
 
Due to the destructive nature of fires, there is typically less debris than other 
disasters (USEPA, 1995).  There are few documented accounts of waste 
management following fire events, those reported include the 1991 Oakland 
firestorm (State of California, 1997), 1993 Malibu, California, coastal fires 
(USEPA, 1995), 2000 Cerro Grande wildfires (USEPA, 2008) and 2003 Cedar 
and Pines Fires, San Diego (County of San Diego, 2005).  Responses to debris 
management following these fires were varied in their assessment of 
environmental and public health hazards associated with management of the 
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debris.  Consequently a range of management options were employed during 
the responses, including private property clearance by property owners; local 
government facilitated cleanups; a combination of insurance, federal and local 
government funding; and mixed efforts to recycle. 
 
The first and most comprehensive national guidance on disaster debris 
management was the USEPA’s “Planning for Disaster Debris” (USEPA, 1995) 
which was updated in 2008 (USEPA, 2008).  Outside the US the 
understanding of the need to plan for debris management is growing 
(Johnston et al., 2009, JEU, 2010). 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Interviews 
Interviews were held with professionals and community members either 
involved in or affected by the waste management following the Bushfires.  The 
interviews were carried out in August 2009 and March 2010, six and 13 
months after Black Saturday respectively. 
 
In total, eight professionals (including contractors, private waste firms, 
council waste managers, government regulators and disaster managers) and 
14 community members were interviewed using a semi-structured interview 
approach.   
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3.2 Analysis 
The analysis focuses on the decision points in the waste management 
programme.  Decision points determine the path and in turn overall success of 
a process.  In order for lessons to be learnt that can help position communities 
to respond better in the future, it is important to understand and anticipate 
what decisions will have to be made, how to better make these decisions and 
what information is needed to do so.  The analysis was informed by the both 
the interviews and the study of pre and post-disaster literature. 
 
For each key decision identified the analysis focused on: the decision-making 
process; the delays associated with the decision; the organisational aspects of 
the decision; the legal constraints; and the environmental, economic and 
social effects.  
 
4 Analysis 
A flow diagram summarising the decision-making associated with the waste 
management process is shown in Figure 4.1.  The diagram is a chronological 
account (although not to scale) and shows the events that occurred (star 
shape), the activities that took place (rectangular boxes), the decisions that 
were made (diamonds) and any delays that occurred (a pair of vertical parallel 
lines).  The diagram is also split into 3 levels (local authority, state 
government and individual) to indicate who undertook the decisions and/or 
activities.  Arrows are used to show the flow through the diagram.
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Figure 4.1 2009 Victorian Bushfires waste management decision flow chart 
 4.1 Decision 1: Establishment of VBRRA 
Due to the scale of the disaster, the Commonwealth and Victorian 
Governments elected to establish the Victorian Bushfire Recovery and 
Reconstruction Authority (VBRRA) to “guide the recovery and rebuild 
process” (VBRRA, accessed 2010).  The decision to form this authority was not 
directly related to management of the bushfire waste, however, it is included 
here as VBRRA forms the umbrella of the entire disaster recovery system 
which debris management forms a part.   
 
Overall the timely establishment of VBRRA played a positive role in the waste 
management process.  VBRRA took overall responsibility for the waste 
management programme, gave a focal point to the community for waste 
management issues and initiated the coordination of the appropriate 
regulators and contractors to implement the project.  The main weakness of 
this approach was the limited longitudinal involvement of specialised waste 
management personnel in strategic development. .  If VBRRA had not been 
established, waste management would have been the responsibility of the 
already overwhelmed local government authorities. 
 
4.2 Decision 2: Government funding 
Two weeks after Black Saturday, the Commonwealth and State Government of 
Victoria elected to jointly pay for and facilitate the demolition and debris 
disposal of private and public buildings destroyed by the bushfires – a 
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responsibility which would ordinarily rest with private property owners and 
municipalities, respectively.  
 
The justification for this decision was to clear debris and hazardous materials 
from bushfire affected properties and to help start people rebuilding (The 
Premier of Victoria, 2009) and in turn benefit the economic recovery of the 
community.   
 
The decision required political and financial support which took time to 
establish.  However, if no funding had been provided significant delays in the 
demolition and debris removal would have arisen.  In particular, it would take 
time for insurance payouts, charitable donations and possibly government 
grants to be assessed and awarded before individual property owners could 
facilitate clean-up works.  These delays would also have potentially 
exacerbated any negative environmental, social and economic impacts.  
 
In general, government funding of private property demolition and debris 
removal was very successful.  The initiative had the desired effect of 
facilitating a timely and well coordinated community wide clean-up operation.  
The two major disadvantages of the government funding.  The first is the 
potential for setting a funding precedence for future disasters such that the 
community expect government assistance and do not insure for management 
of disaster waste.  The second is the limited scope of the government funding 
programme.  Individual property owners were responsible for any clean-up 
works outside the scope of the Grocon contract, however, there was also a 
general reluctance to carry out the work and an expectation that the 
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government should or would provide additional funding.  There were also 
reported instances of illegal dumping from residents unwilling to pay the high 
disposal costs.  Limited systems were not put in place to ensure residents were 
aware of their responsibilities and were in a position to manage the waste in 
an appropriate manner.   
4.3 Decision 3: Single waste classification and management 
procedures 
To expedite debris removal and minimise hazards to people and the 
environment, the Victorian Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Department of Human Services (DHS) elected to classify all bushfire waste as 
a single classification.  The classification assumed the waste was Construction 
& Demolition waste plus other contaminants, including Class B (non-friable) 
asbestos.  Provisions under Section 30A of the Victorian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1970 and Section 55 of the Dangerous Goods Act (Victorian 
Government Gazette, 2009), 1985 were activated to formalise the 
classification.  The combined regulations stipulated stream-lined handling, 
transportation and disposal methods for management of the bushfire waste. 
 
Coroner investigations in the affected area and the time taken to decide that 
the government would fund the clean-up meant EPA and DHS had 
approximately four weeks to establish processes for waste handling, 
transportation and disposal.  However, in another event, a four week delay in 
establishing waste management procedures may not be acceptable, especially 
if significant acute hazards existed in the waste matrix and threatened 
residents.  If no over-arching classification had been made, each site would 
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have had to be independently assessed or tested for contaminants causing 
significant delays, public concern and increased disposal costs (for 
contaminated materials). 
 
The single waste classification expedited the speed of the cleanup works with 
both minimal environmental and health and safety risk to waste handlers and 
the public.  The legal arrangements that allowed for the waste classification 
were straightforward to implement and effective  despite the absence of clear 
guidance on how emergency waivers should be assessed. 
 
4.4 Decision 4: Centralised demolition and debris removal 
contract 
Three weeks after Black Saturday, the State government let a single “managing 
contract” to coordinate and to manage subcontractors for demolition and 
debris removal works.  The contract included all public and private buildings 
destroyed in the bushfires.  Individual property owners were not required to 
participate, other than salvaging of personal belongings if desired. 
 
The contract was awarded to an Australian building contractor called Grocon.  
Approximately 70% of subcontracts (and 50% of the labour) were sourced 
from the local community.   
 
Despite the initial delays associated with letting the contract (which were in 
parallel with Coronary investigations), the centralised demolition and debris 
removal contract accelerated waste removal and demolition works and led to 
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quality work.  If property owners had been required to facilitate their own 
clean-up, it would have been extremely difficult to ensure rapid and safe  
debris removal .    
The majority of respondents agreed that the centralised demolition and debris 
removal contract, implemented by Grocon, for debris removal was a success.  
The centralised demolition and debris removal contract allowed for efficient 
removal (within the six month completion target) and streamlined and 
consistent health and safety and environmental procedures across all affected 
areas.  Organisational structures were simple and economy of scale for the 
physical works (including resource allocation) was also possible.  The major 
drawback to the centralised demolition and debris removal contract was the 
limited community consultation and use of non-local labour.   
 
4.5 Decision 5: Construction of a new landfill cell 
The majority of the bushfire waste went to existing municipal waste landfills a 
significant distance from the affected area.  However, due to several incidents 
involving waste-laden trucks travelling on a dangerous stretch of road, an 
urgency developed to find an alternate disposal site.  A landfill cell at an 
existing landfill site (owned by Murrindindi Shire) was identified.  A landfill 
cell was designed (at a lower specification than other landfills receiving the 
bushfire waste), consented and constructed in just 10 days.  After construction 
and operation of the cell by Grocon, it was capped and handed back to 
Murrindindi Shire.  The 30 year maintenance requirements for the landfill cell 
remain with the Shire.   
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The essence of this decision is whether or not an additional facility with a 
potentially higher environmental risk, should have been used to reduce an 
occupational health and safety hazard.  It is unclear how these potential effects 
were assessed, traded-off and justified and who carries the liability for this 
decision.   
 
The fast design, construction and consenting process showed good 
collaboration between organisations.  The new landfill significantly reduced 
health and safety risk to the public and the truck drivers and reduced haulage 
costs.  However, the execution of the new landfill siting and consenting could 
have been improved.  The assessment process and justification for the reduced 
environmental standards (based on a health and safety risk) was unclear and 
seemingly undocumented.  In addition, the expedited processes used for 
consenting has the potential to introduce future liability issues at the site.  
 
4.6 Communication 
An overriding theme within all the above decisions is communication, 
including: gathering information to assist in decision-making; facilitating 
decision-making (inter-agency communication); informing the public on how 
decisions were made; and educating on individual’s responsibilities. 
 
In general, the inter-agency communication was reactionary – due to the 
absence of a plan - but effective.  Roles and responsibilities were undefined 
and overall responsibilities for various aspects of the waste management 
process were unclear.   
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Communication of the waste management decisions with the public, however, 
was less effective.  The State Emergency Recovery Plan (Emergency 
Management in Victoria, 2005) outlines that community communication 
plans should be established ‘as soon as practicable’ in the recovery process.  
Despite this no community-wide consultation was carried out prior to 
establishment or during implementation of the clean-up programme.   
Effective communication may have short-circuited some of the community 
dissatisfaction.  Health and safety concerns and potential environmental 
impacts would have also been mitigated for individual clean-up operations. 
 
5 Discussion 
One common theme from the interviews was a general reluctance to plan for 
waste management for disasters,  There are several possible reasons for this 
viewpoint: 
- The perceived difficulty in planning for the unknown. 
- The low probability of such large scale disasters. 
- The success of this particular debris management process 
(implemented without a plan in place). 
 
Despite the relatively effective reactionary waste management response 
following this event, waste management planning is needed to reduce waste’s 
lingering impacts (Solis et al., 1995, Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999, USEPA, 
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2008).  A key  step to improve  disaster waste management is, consequently, 
transcending the paradigm that planning is not possible or useful.   
 
The key to flexible and transferable disaster waste management plans is to 
develop the plan around decision points.  This can be achieved by anticipating: 
what decisions will need to be made; who should make the decision; what 
information will be needed; how the decision will be made; and how the 
decision will be communicated and then implemented.  This approach is 
considered more effective than instituting operational plans which may not be 
appropriate for every disaster situation. 
6 Recommendations 
In the Victorian context, the first and most important step is to prepare 
disaster waste management plans at municipal level.  The plans must include 
clear pre and post disaster consultation and communication strategies.  The 
plans should: 
 
• Establish an organisational structure with roles and responsibilities, 
and decision-making delegation that fits within the overall recovery 
framework.  This should include solid waste professionals and 
community representatives. 
• Determine a funding policy - a tiered approach based on disaster 
impact.  Private property owner and government responsibilities 
should be well defined and the role of insurance included. 
• Establish maximum acceptable environmental and health and safety 
risks for different levels of disaster impact and methods of assessing 
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those risks.  Consider whether legal provisions need to be bounded to 
reflect these standards. 
• Establish a strategy for the physical works, alongside the tiered funding 
strategy above.  Consider state and local responses, property owner 
roles and responsibilities, contractor involvement and local labour use.  
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